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Abstract
Several approaches to the product of non-additive monotone measures (or capacities)
are discussed and a new approach is proposed. It starts with the Mobius product
[E. Hendon, H.J. Jacobsen, B. Sloth, T. Tranæs, The product of capacities and belief
functions, Mathematical Social Sciences 32 (1996) 95–108] of totally monotone measures
and extends it by means of a supremum to general monotone measures. The sup runs
over sets of totally monotone measures. These sets are defined like the core of monotone
measures (or cooperative games). The new product is compatible with the partial order
6 for arbitrary monotone measures. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The Copenhagen group Hendon et al. [3] has shown convincingly that
among the dierent approaches for the product of non-additive monotone
measures (or capacities) the version using the Mobius representation has best
properties if one restricts to totally monotone measures. Especially it extends
the classical product of additive measures. But in general this product, per-
formed with monotone measures is not monotone any more.
Koshevoy [4] proposes a class of so called triangulation products. First he
defines the product of f0; 1g-valued monotone measures as a sup of totally
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monotone f0; 1g-valued measures (or unanimity games) and extends this def-
inition by piecewise linearity with respect to a triangulation of the set of nor-
med monotone measures, the wedges being f0; 1g-valued monotone measures.
Constructing a triangulation containing the totally monotone measures as a
simplex, he can overcome the above mentioned shortcoming of the Mobius
product. Another (canonical) one among the triangulation products is the
chain product. It is again a monotone measure, but it is not additive if both
factors are additive measures.
We propose a variant of the core, the totally monotone core of a set function
(or cooperative game) where totally monotone measures (or belief functions)
replace the additive ones in the very definition. Taking the sup of the products
of the respective core elements, we extend the Mobius product for totally
monotone measures to arbitrary measures. This new product of monotone
measures is – like the triangulation products – always monotone and the main
achievement is that it behaves monotone in both factors.
Compatibility of the product with the partial order 6 of monotone mea-
sures is essential if one is concerned with imprecise probabilities, e.g., for the
issue of generalised stochastic independence. Since imprecision of probabilities
can be described by a pair of conjugate monotone measures, one would also
appreciate to have a product which is compatible with conjugation of mono-
tone measures. With respect to conjugation we get only the partial result (9).
Another open question concerns associativity of the product if the factors are
not totally monotone or f0; 1g-valued.
2. Chain and Mobius representation of a monotone measure
For simplicity we suppose that X is a nonvoid finite set. Throughout, a
(normed) set function m on the power set 2X is a real valued function
m : 2X ! 0; 1 with m;  0 and mX  1. A set function m is called a monotone
measure if A  B implies mA6 mB. A set function m is called k-monotone,
k P 2 , if for A1; . . . ;Ak  X
m
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2-monotonicity is also called supermodularity. Submodularity is the corre-
sponding property with the reversed inequality sign. m is totally monotone or a
belief function if it is monotone and k-monotone for any k P 2.
The familiar method of representing a real function on a finite set as linear
combination of indicator functions will be applied to a monotone measure m.
First, m has only finitely many distinct upper level sets f;g  S1     Sn
274 D. Denneberg / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 24 (2000) 273–281
 2X, i.e. Si  fA  X j mAP tig for some ti and 1  t1 > t2 >    > tn > 0.
Defining gi by giA  1 if A 2 Si and  0 else, we get a representation of m as
linear combination of f0; 1g-valued monotone measures,
m 
Xn
i1
cigi with distinct f0; 1g-valued g16    6 gn and all ci > 0:
1
Furthermore, any monotone measure m has only one representation of type (1).
We call it the chain representation of m.
There are still simpler f0; 1g-valued monotone measures than the g above,
the ‘unanimity games’ of cooperative game theory. A unanimity game uK for
‘coalition’ K 2 2X, K 6 ;, is the monotone measure defined by uKA  1 i
A  K and  0 else. Every f0; 1g-valued monotone measure g can be written as
a maximum (we use the sign _) of unanimity games
g 
_
j
uKj ; where Kj are the minimal sets K with gK  1: 2
g is also a linear combination of unanimity games with integer coecients,
which can easily be derived from (2) applying the principle of inclusion ex-
clusion (see [2]). Combining this result with (1) we get a representation of an
arbitrary monotone m as linear combination of unanimity games, the coecient
of uK being denoted lmK,
m 
X
KX
K 6;
lmK uK : 3
Again, this representation is unique since the unanimity games are linearly
independent. This is the well known Mobius representation of m. Compared to
the chain representation, it has the disadvantage that the coecients lmKmay
assume negative values and the advantage that the f0; 1g-valued monotone
measures used in the representation, the unanimity games, are totally mono-
tone, whereas generally the gi in (1) don’t have this property. If the coecients
in (3) are all non-negative, lm P 0, then m is totally monotone like the uK , and
the converse is also true.
Finally, in this preparatory section, we recall the definition of the conjugate m
of a set function m,
mA : 1ÿ mX n A:
In applications to imprecise probabilities the pair m; m describes the impreci-
sion or uncertainty, especially if m 6 m. The dierence mÿ m is called ambiguity
or vagueness (see e.g. [2, Section 9]).
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3. The totally monotone core
Combining (1) with (2), it can easily be seen that m is a maximum of linear
combinations of unanimity games with positive coecients, hence a maximum
of totally monotone measures. This nice property had been the motivation to
introduce the following variant of the (additive) core.
First recall the definition of the core from cooperative game theory
core m : fa j a additive on 2X; m6 a; aX  mXg of a set function m on 2X.
Here we take the dual view and call corem : core m the additive core of m, i.e.,
corem : fa j a additive on 2X; a6 m; aX  mXg:
It is well known that core m 6 ; if m is supermodular (convex) so that
corem 6 ; if m is submodular. Analogously we define the totally monotone
core 1 as
corem : fb j b totally monotone on 2X; b6 m; bX  mXg:
Obviously corem  corem and, as noted at the beginning of this section, we
get
corem 6 ;; m 
_
b2corem
b 4
for arbitrary monotone m. More general we have
Proposition 3.1. Given a monotone measure m on 2X and a chain K  2X, there
exists a totally monotone measure b such that b6 m and which coincides with m on
K, i.e. bjK  mjK.
Proof. Let ;  K0      Kn  X be the chain K. We construct b via its
Mobius representation,
lbKi : mKi ÿ mKiÿ1P 0; i  1; . . . ; n;
lbA : 0 for A 2 2X nK:
Then bKi 
P
AKi l
bA  mKi for all i. For arbitrary A  X select the
maximal index i such that Ki  A. Then bA  bKi  mKi6 mA, which
completes the proof. 
1 corem might also be an interesting solution concept in cooperative game theory. b 2 corem
defines a distribution lb P 0 of total wealth mX to all coalitions K 6 ;, not only to singletons like
the elements of corem. Notice that with the present notations mK is the maximal value, coalition
K (together with its subcoalitions) can get.
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As a corollary we get that for any function X on X there exists a bX 2 corem
with
R
X dm  R X dbX . Here the integral is the Choquet integral. Again, for the
additive core the corresponding result holds only if m is submodular.
Example 3.1. coreuK  ; if K has at least two elements. But coreuK consists
of all convex combinations of the unanimity games uL, L  K, coreuK 
fPLK aLuL j aL P 0 for all L  K; PLK aL  1g. Since coreuK 6 ; we get
also coreuK 6 ; in accordance with (4).
4. The Mo¨bius product
Let X1 and X2 be finite sets and X : X1  X2 their cartesian product. The
problems with the product arise from the fact that 2X1  2X2 does not identify
via A1;A2 7!A1  A2 with 2X1X2 but only with a proper subfamily. In this
article we consider only products m1 
 m2 of two monotone measures m1 on 2X1
and m2 on 2X2 with the property
m1 
 m2A1  A2  m1A1m2A2; Ai  Xi: 5
This property is stronger as to require that m1, m2 are the marginals of m1 
 m2. In
terms of conditioning, property (5) is related to Bayes’ update rule (cf. [1]). But
how to define a product for arbitrary sets in X?
We further require that the product of unanimity games is again a unanimity
game. Then (5) implies
uK1 
 uK2  uK1K2 ; Ki  Xi: 6
Hendon et al. [3] advocate to extend this formula by bilinearity, applied to the
Mobius representation (3) of the monotone measures m1 and m2,
m1 
l m2 :
X
K1;K2
lm1K1lm2K2uK1 
 uK2 ; 7
where Ki runs through all nonempty subsets of Xi, i  1; 2. We will call the
product m1 
l m2 the Mobius product, whence the index l in the notation. The
right hand side of (7) simultaneously gives the Mobius representation of
m1 
l m2. Notice that the Mobius coecients lm1
m2K of the product are
vanishing if K is not a product set K1  K2.
Proposition 4.1.
(i) The Mobius product is linear in both factors and (5) holds;
(ii) if m1, m2 are additive then m1 
l m2 is the classical additive product;
(iii) m1 
l m2 is totally monotone iff m1, m2 are totally monotone (i.e., lmi P 0);
(iv) if m2 is totally monotone then k16 m1 implies k1 
l m26 m1 
l m2;
(v) m1 
l m2 
l m3  m1 
l m2 
l m3.
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If one restricts to totally monotone set functions, property (iv) implies that
the Mobius product is monotone in both factors.
Proof. The proofs are straightforward, only (iv) needs some explanation (this
property cannot be found in [3]). We may assume m2  uK2 for some K2  X2.
For A  X1  X2 define A1 :
S
K1K2A K1  X1 and show k1 
l uK2A k1A1. Since the same equality holds with m1, the assertion follows from
k16 m1. 
Fubini’s Theorem, for the Choquet integral, holds in the following sense [2].
Proposition 4.2. If m1 is totally monotone, thenZ
X dm1 
l m26
Z Z
X x1;x2dm1x1dm2x2
and equality holds if m2 is additive.
A serious shortcoming of the Mobius product is, that monotonicity is not
inherited by the product. Thus, it provides a satisfactory product only for
totally monotone measures (see (iii)).
Example 4.1. Let giAi  1 i Ai 6 ;, Ai  Xi, i.e., gi  uXi . Suppose
Xi  fai; big, i  1; 2, and let g : g1 
l g2, then gfa1; a2; b1; b2g  2
whereas gfa1; a2; a1; b2; b1; b2g  1, whence g is not monotone.
For belief functions the Mobius product of m1, m2 can be described easily as
follows. Regard the Mobius transform lmi of mi as an additive measure on the
measurable space 2Xi ; 22Xi . Let l : 22X1X2 ! 0; 1 be the usual additive
product of lm1 , lm2 on the powerset of 2X1  2X2 , extended trivially to the
powerset of 2X1X2 . Then m1 
l m2 is the belief function with Mobius transform
l.
5. Triangulation products
To circumvent the unpleasant phenomenon of Example 4.1 Koshevoy [4]
proposes further products in representing normed monotone measures as
convex combinations of f0; 1g-valued monotone measures. Since these repre-
sentations are not unique, he fixes a triangulation of the set of all monotone
measures with the f0; 1g-valued monotone measures as vertices, with respect to
which there is a unique representation.
First the product of f0; 1g-valued monotone measures has to be defined.
According to (2) and (6) it is natural to set [4]
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g1 
 g2 :
_
j1;j2
uK1;j1 
 uK2;j2 
_
giKi1
i1;2
uK1 
 uK2 ; 8
where we use the representations (2) gi 
W
ji
uKi;ji on 2
Xi , i  1; 2. The product
g1 
 g2 is a f0; 1g-valued monotone measure on 2X1X2 and it behaves mono-
tone and associative for f0; 1g-valued monotone measures.
In the situation of Example 4.1 we get as desired g1 
 g2A  1 i A 6 ;,
i.e., uX1 
 uX2  uX1X2 . In other words, the product (8) of the non-informative
pairs uXi ; uXi, i  1; 2, now is the non-informative pair uX; uX on the product
set X  X1  X2. This result generalises to arbitrary unanimity games,
uK1 
 uK2  uK1K2  uK1 
 uK2 : 9
The easy proof relies on the general formula uK 
W
x2K ufxg.
Koshevoy constructs triangulations which contain the set of totally mono-
tone measures as a simplex. Given such a triangulation, every monotone
measure belongs to exactly one simplex of minimal dimension and can
uniquely be represented as a convex combination of the extreme points (i.e.,
f0; 1g-valued monotone measures) of that simplex. Then the product (8) is
extended by bilinearity like the Mobius product above. But now, since only
linear combinations with positive coecients are used, the product is always a
monotone measure.
There is another interesting triangulation where the vertices of each simplex
form a chain of f0; 1g-valued monotone measures. Since this triangulation is
canonical, there is no need to refer explicitly to triangulations for defining the
corresponding product. The chain product [2,4] of monotone measures applies
the chain representations mi 
P
ki
ci;kigi;ki ; with distinct gi;16    6 gi;ni and all
ci;ki > 0, i  1; 2, (see (1)),
m1 
j m2 :
X
k1;k2
c1;k1 c2;k2g1;k1 
 g2;k2 : 10
Since the ci;ki are positive, m1 
j m2 is a monotone measure, too, and (5) holds.
The f0; 1g-valued monotone measures on the right hand side of (10) are not
totally ordered, so this is not the chain representation of the product m1 
j m2.
Hence associativity is not obvious like for the Mobius product and it is still an
open problem. Another shortcoming here is, that for additive monotone m1, m2
it happens that the chain product is not additive.
6. An alternative product
Here we generalise formula (8) directly. Notice that among the f0; 1g-valued
monotone measures the totally monotone ones are the unanimity games, which
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appear on the right hand side of that formula. Analogously to (2), monotone
measures mi on 2Xi can be represented as (see (4))
mi 
_
bi2coremi
bi; i  1; 2:
Now we define our new product,
m1 
 m2 :
_
bi2coremi
i1;2
b1 
l b2:
It inherits the good properties, which the Mobius product has for totally
monotone measures.
Proposition 6.1.
(i) m1 
 m2 is a monotone measure for arbitrary monotone measures m1, m2 and
(5) holds;
(ii) m1 
 m2 coincides with the Mobius product m1 
l m2 for totally monotone
measures m1, m2;
(iii) m1 
 m2 coincides with (8) for f0; 1g-valued monotone measures m1, m2;
(iv) ki6 mi, i  1; 2, implies k1 
 k26 m1 
 m2;
(v) associativity
m1 
 m2 
 m3  m1 
 m2 
 m3
holds at least if all mi are totally monotone or f0; 1g-valued.
Proof. The proofs of (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) are straightforward, but notice that
monotonicity of the Mobius product ((iv) in Proposition 4.1) plays an im-
portant ro^le, not only for (iv), but also for (ii).
For (iii) with f0; 1g-valued mi  gi we have to show_
bi2coremi
i1;2
b1 
l b2 
_
giKi1
i1;2
uK1 
 uK2 : 11
For the Ki on the right hand side uKi 2 coregi so that P holds in (11). If in
Eq. (7) for b1 
l b2 the product of unanimity games uK1 
 uK2 appears with a
coecient 6 0; then giKi  1, i  1; 2, so that uK1 
 uK2 appears also on the
right hand side of (11). Since the (nonnegative) coecients of (7) sum to 1 we
get 6 in (11). 
7. Conclusion and outlook
We have combined ideas of existing models for the product of monotone
measures to construct a product which is again monotone and is compatible
with the partial order 6 in both factors. Also a dual approach is feasible,
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which, in terms of conditioning, is related to the Dempster-Shafer update rule
(cf. [1]). It starts with the conjugate uK of the unanimity games, represents an
arbitrary monotone measure as linear combination of the uK (dual Mobius
representation), reverses inequalities and replaces the sup _ with the inf ^ . The
resulting dual product equals m1 
 m2 and things would be easy if this equalled
m1 
 m2 (in (9) we got this equality only for unanimity games). But since things
are not easy the question arises, which pair should be taken as the product of
imprecision pairs mi6 mi; i  1; 2? There are four possibilities m1 
 m26 m1 
 m2,
m1 
 m26 m1 
 m2, m1 
 m26 m1 
 m2 and m1 
 m26 m1 
 m2 .
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